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Introduction
Since the work of Almond and Verba (1963) , scholars have recognized the importance of civic culture for the success of (emerging) democracies. Democratic rule is defined by the existence not only of certain institutional structures in a society, but also of a participatory political culture. Particularly after waves of democratic transformations, such as the collapse of the communist bloc in the early 1990s and the (still ongoing) Arab spring, public and scientific debates center around the question whether political attitudes in formerly autocratic societies will soon reflect the newly established democratic institutions or whether non-democratic attitudes will continue to prevail in society. One important benchmark for such changes in political attitudes is identification with democratic parties (Campbell et al., 1960; Shively, 1972) . The more loyal citizens are to the newly established democratic parties, the lower the impact of exogenous shocks such as economic crises on public support for the democratic system in general.
In his seminal article "Of Time and Partisan Stability," Converse (1969) elaborates the idea that party identification intensifies in strength over the life course, such that every experience of a democratic election reinforces people's existing partisan identity. As a consequence of this individual-level process of cumulative political learning, new democracies increase in stability at an aggregate level with every democratic election. Abramson (1979) and others have questioned this conclusion on empirical grounds, arguing on the basis of more advanced age-period-cohort models and repeated cross-sectional data that much of the reported age effect in the strength of party identification is in fact due to generational differences. Yet other scholars interpret the age gradient in the strength of party identification as reflecting sociological life-cycle differences rather than electoral experiences (Nie et al., 1974; Niemi et al., 1985) .
Debates about the age gradient in the strength of party identification are uniquely suited to illustrate the added value of panel data and random growth curve models in the context of APC analysis. First, panel data permit the researcher to relax the simplifying assumption of homogeneous age effects that come with repeated cross-sectional data. Instead, panel data allow the researcher to estimate heterogeneous growth trajectories in an outcome of interest, for instance, across cohorts but also individuals (Yang, 2007) .
This article draws on this advantage when studying the effects of different early experiences of democratic and autocratic rule for the growth rate in the strength of party identification. Also, the article considers the age at first contact with a new democratic society as a source of individual differences in growth trajectories of partisan strength. This allows the study to shed light on the question of whether citizens in emerging democracies who were socialized under autocratic rule are able to develop meaningful party identification in the new system, or whether stable political loyalties only emerge in newly established democracies after a gap of one generation (Dalton, 1994) .
A second advantage of random growth curve models and multi-cohort panel data compared to APC models based on repeated cross-sectional data lies in the possibility to simultaneously specify multiple temporal processes constituting an age effect. The article illustrates this advantage by studying the extent to which the growth trajectory in the strength of party identifi-cation evolves from repeated electoral experiences as suggested by Converse (1969) or by sociological life-cycle differences as suggested by many other scholars (Nie et al., 1974; Niemi et al., 1985) .
Data
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a longitudinal household survey established in West Germany in 1984. Since the beginning of the study, the SOEP has included a special sample of immigrants to Germany. A sample of East Germans was added in mid-1990 before reunification, when the GDR was still in existence. The ongoing annual survey is extended regularly with refreshment samples, and currently consists of a representative national sample of 24,000 individuals in 12,000 households (Kroh, 2011) .The sample analyzed here covers birth cohorts from 1882 to 1992. The earliest 10 percent were born pre-1929 and the latest 10 percent were born post-1980.
1 The median birth cohort is 1957. Age varies between 16 and 102 with a median age of 44.
Strength of party identification -the outcome of interest-has been measured in the SOEP since 1984 on an annual basis using the standard measurement from German political science (Falter et al., 2000) . This instrument draws on three consecutive questions: "Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote for another 1 As noted below, the number of respondents in the present analysis is larger than the current sample because of refreshments for people who have died, moved out of the country, or stopped their participation in the panel.
party. Do you lean towards a particular party?" If respondents answer affirmatively, they are asked "Which party do you lean toward?"and then "And to what extent?". 2 The 4-point scale of partisan strength (ranging from 0 to 3) used in this paper differentiates among respondents who report no party identification, those who lean "very weakly/weakly", "somewhat", and "rather/very strongly" towards one party.
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The mean number of measures of partisan strength among SOEP respondents is 8, with a maximum of 27. Since many of the respondents come from recent refreshment samples, this figure underestimates the durability of respondents' participation in the SOEP. If one only considers respondents who entered the SOEP before 1992, the mean number of measures of party identification increases to 13. Considering the entire history of interviews with each individual, 32 percent of the roughly 45,000 respondents analyzed here never report a party identification, 40 percent report a (very) strong leaning at least once in the period under investigation, with the other 28 percent reporting at maximum a weak respectively moderate party identification.
To measure different early experiences of SOEP respondents, the analysis draws on contextual data collected by the political project "Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010" directed by Monty G. Marshall.
These aggregate data are merged with the SOEP survey data at the level of 2 Although the prevalence and the meaning of a strong party identification may in principle vary across parties, due to the lack of specific hypotheses, the analysis treats a strong party identification for the Christian Democrats, for instance, in the same way as a strong party identification for the Social Democrats.
3 To improve balance in the scale, the analysis lumps together sparsely populated answer categories such as weak and very weak leanings.
countries and years. More specifically, SOEP respondents receive the annual polity score of their country of residence when they were 17 years old. This is the (East/West) German annual polity score in native Germans, but in persons immigrating to Germany as adults, this is usually the annual polity score of their country of origin.
4 Table 1 reports the mean polity score in ten-year groups of birth cohorts who resided in East Germany in 1989, in
West Germany in 1989, and immigrants to Germany. The reported polity score varies between autocracy (-10) and democracy (+10). score +10), East German birth cohorts up to the mid-1970s were socialized in an autocratic regime (GDR polity score -9).
The mean polity score in immigrants hovers around zero, indicating that some immigrants were raised in autocratic, some in democratic societies.
Some of the most frequent countries of origin of so-called labor migrants 
Previous Research
In the "American Voter", Campbell et al. (1960) report a growing partisan intensity during the individual life-cycle. Converse (1969) elaborates on this idea and derives aggregate predictions of the stability of partisan strength for individuals in democracies experiencing political transformations based on the individual model of partisan strength (see also, Converse, 1976; Gluchowski, 1983) . According to this model, partisan strength grows with every experience of a democratic election (learning process). The marginal ben-5 For instance, the largest group in the SOEP, Turkish immigrants, experienced, depending on their year of birth, regimes with 9 different polity scores that range between -7 and +9.
efit of any additional experience is said to decline, however, the larger the cumulative experience of individuals (resistance phenomenon). Moreover, individuals start as political novices with a higher initial strength of party identification if they were socialized in a partisan family (transmission process). Finally, suspension of the democratic process reduces the individual partisan intensity again (forgetting process). This figure lends itself, however, not only to life-cycle interpretation, but could also be interpreted as evidence of generational differences in partisan intensity in Germany. 7 In the 1970s, this debate on age versus cohort effects in partisan strength gained momentum with the debate on partisan dealignment (Dalton et al., 1984) , the availability of new data sources, and new developments in the modeling of age, period, and cohort effects (Ryder, 1965; Glenn, 1977) .
6 The drop off in the strength of party identification in persons aged 80 and older is less in line with Converse's model. 7 Although Converse (1969) considers aging effects to be predominant, he discusses possible sources of confounding cohort differences in specific groups within society.
According to a popular thesis, educational expansion in the 1960s and 1970s reduced the need for strong party identification in many Western societies. The increased cognitive mobilization in a large segment of new cohorts facilitates issue voting and thus renders the decisional function of party identification as a simple heuristic obsolete (Shively, 1979) . Moreover, social change is said to have partly overcome the traditional social cleavages in Europe's "frozen" party systems, thus dissolving the bond between voters and parties that existed in the past (e.g., Evans, 1999) . Irrespective of the cause, longitudinal data from many Western societies suggest that partisan strength is declining, contrary to the prediction of the Converse model that partisan strength should remain stable in aging societies or even increase with each new election (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) . This trend was already documented in the 1960s for young US cohorts. For Germany, the context under investigation, cohorts entering the electorate in the 1970s showed declining levels of partisanship (Baker, 1974; Baker et al., 1981) .
In a number of studies, scholars have tried to empirically disentangle the effects of age (life-cycle interpretation) and cohort (generational interpretation) in repeated cross-sectional data of partisan strength. While some scholars find cohort differences to be predominant (Abramson, 1976 (Abramson, , 1979 , a large body of research takes a mediating position, arguing that both age and cohort effects influence partisan strength (Crittenden, 1962; Cutler, 1969; Converse, 1976; Glenn and Hefner, 1972; Jennings and Markus, 1984; Shively, 1979; Cassel, 1993; Tilley, 2002) .
The Nature of Time
The literature on life-cycle effects in party identification discusses multiple sources for the increase in partisan strength in the lifespan. These processes are all empirically highly correlated with calendar age but conceptually distinct. As described before, Converse (1969) speaks of electoral experience as the primary factor leading to age differences in partisan strength. This hypothesis builds on the notion of the so-called decisional function of party identification, put forward by Shively (1979) . According to this view, persons who lack information on the range of political choices offered by the parties in a specific election develop a party identification as a simple heuristic for choosing between the various parties and candidates. The repeated experience of being confronted with electoral choices reinforces existing loyalties in citizens, which results in a growing strength of party identification.
Scholars of migration research provide a second account of age differences in the strength of party identifications. Particularly studies on the development of party identification in immigrants highlight the importance of the length of exposure to a new political system (Black et al., 1987; Cain et al., 1991; Cho, 1999; Jones-Correa, 1998; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Wong, 2000) . The idea behind the mobilizing effects of passive political exposure is that the dissemination of information through interpersonal communication and public news increases people's contextual knowledge of political processes and actors. Based on this procedural knowledge, persons are better able to develop a strong party identification. but they may devote more time to politics again after retirement (Nie et al., 1974; Niemi et al., 1985) . This sociological life-cycle perspective, which predicts a non-linear effect of aging, corresponds to a certain extent with the simple growth curve reported in Figure 1 .
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In sum, the most commonly cited sources of life-cycle effects can be divided into sociological approaches and political science approaches. While studies in sociology highlight critical life-stages, political science approaches stress the importance of political learning for age differences in the strength of party identification. More specifically, the political science view suggests 8 The cognitive and socio-emotional functioning of individuals is also subject to lifecycle differences, but the psychological literature -to my knowledge-does not provide clear evidence of when in the lifespan the most intense party identifications emerge. While the results of Hess (2001) suggest that the need for structure and thus the tendency to order complex environments based on in and out-groups increases with age, one may also argue that young adults' lack of political information increases their need for party identification as a heuristic in political decision-making.
that partisan strength increases with passive exposure to the political context, on the one hand, and with active electoral experience on the other. All these possible sources of life-cycle effects may operate simultaneously, but are very difficult to empirically disentangle. In many data sources, calendar age is collinear with growing political exposure and the number of elections experienced. All these differences between East and West Germans and immigrants from different origins are reflected in the data of the Socio-Economic Panel, which oversamples former labor migrants (sub-sample B), East Germans (sub-sample C), and ethnic German immigrants (sub-sample D). The survey provides considerable information on differences in the calendar age, political exposure, and electoral experience of respondents. In fact, the correlation between age and exposure in 1999, the middle of the observation period, was "only" .69, and between exposure and experience "only" .84.
Experiences of Autocratic Regimes
Time is often considered a primary force in breeding loyalties to democratic Two factors are frequently cited as reducing the growth rate in partisan strength: first, entry to a new political system relatively late in life, and second, socialization in an autocratic society. These two factors coincide empirically in many democratizing societies. In Eastern Europe, for instance, many citizens had no other experience but the autocratic regimes that have lasted for many decades. But conceptually, late entry to a political system and socialization in an autocratic society are distinct factors.
According to the traditional perspective on party identification, parental transmission is the primary process of the development of attachment to parties (Campbell et al., 1960; Levin, 1961) . Scholars from both traditional and revisionist schools of thought argue that intergenerational transmission may increase the stability of party identifications (Achen, 2002) . Kroh and Selb (2009) Not only the age of political novices may affect growth trajectories in party identification, but also the type of experiences people have during the formative period of young adulthood. A large body of literature suggests that the experience of an autocratic past in Eastern Europe, for instance, has lasting consequences for party identifications in these societies today (Dalton and Buerklin, 1996; Brader and Tucker, 2001; Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Neundorf, 2010) . These studies thus reinforce the idea that early impressions have a lasting effect on political orientations of individuals (Mannheim, 1928; Inglehart, 1971; Broek, 1999; Watts, 1999) . It may therefore be easier for individuals with a democratic background to adapt to a new party system than individuals who have no democratic experience whatsoever and not only need to adjust to a new party system but also to democratic processes in general.
To recapitulate, Table 1 
Random Growth Curve Models
Age-Period-Cohort models are an attractive method to disentangle the relative contribution of each of these three factors in observed temporal changes.
The studies of this special issue primarily aim at isolating the effect of cohort in different outcome variables measured in repeated cross-sectional data. The present study, in contrast, is primarily interested in age effects and furthermore tries to identify different causes of the age effect in the strength of party identification while controlling for cohort and period differences at the same time. This research design requires panel data, that in principle allow one to estimate age effects in each individual separately. Growth curve models, often applied in biology and psychology, represent the method of choice when studying individual age-trajectories in the strength of party identification (Fabio et al., 2006) .
Random growth curve models fall into the class of hierarchical or mixed regression models (e.g., Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005) . These models estimate a sample mean effect of some regressor (called fixed effects) and the variation in this effect across individuals of the sample (called random effects). The random growth curve analysis of this article models the strength of party identification of individual i at time point t, pi it , as a function of the fixed effects of age (A), period (P ), and cohort (C) and a residual term u it . The growth curve A is specified as a metric variable while P and C are treated as categorical variables summarizing groups of panel waves and birth cohorts.
Besides the mean level of partisan strength in the sample, β 0 , and the mean age gradient, β 1 , the random growth curve model also estimates the individual i's deviation from the mean level of partisan strength, ζ 0i , and the individual deviation of the growth rate from the population mean, i.e. ζ 1i . Table 2 reports the estimates of the growth curve models of partisan strength. Models 2 and 4 are random growth curve models and as a robustness check, Models 1 and 3 report the equivalent OLS model without random effects. Yang (2007) demonstrates that the additional degrees of freedom in panel data as opposed to repeated cross-sectional data can be used to estimate interactions between cohort and age effects in growth curve models, and the present study additionally shows that it is also possible to identify more than one source of age differences in growth curve models at the same time.
Sources of Growth Trajectories
The analysis considers k = 1, 2, 3 sources of A, i.e. individual growth in the strength of party identification: the number of democratic elections to the German parliament experienced as eligible voter, A 1 , exposure to a democratic German political system in years, A 2 , and calender age, A 3 .
For each source of the growth trajectory in partisan strength, Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 estimate a random growth curve, ζ k,1i . These random slopes capture individual differences in the relevance of experience, exposure, and age in growth trajectories of partisan strength. To allow for non-linearities in growth rates, all reported models estimate polynomials of degree l = 2, 3, .., 6
for the k = 1, 2, 3 sources of growth in partisan strength. Since higher-order polynomials typically are hard to interpret, Figure 2 plots the estimated growth trajectories and their respective 95 percent confidence bands estimated by model 2.
The growth curve estimates (fixed effects) reported in Figure The 'random part' of Table 2 reports estimates of the variability of the random intercept, σ ζ 0 , the random growth trajectory by electoral experience, σ ζ 1,1 , the random growth trajectory by political exposure, σ ζ 2,1 , and the random growth trajectory by age, σ ζ 3,1 . Large inter-individual standard deviation in the intercept suggests that strength in party identification is to a considerable extent a time-invariant trait of individuals and large interindividual standard deviation in the slopes of experience, exposure, and age indicates that individuals widely differ in their growth trajectory of partisan strength. In fact, Model 2 reported in Table 2 suggests a large interindividual standard deviation in the intercept (σ Intercept = 1.12). Given a residual standard deviation in the model of .8, one can conclude that 66 percent of the variance in the strength of party identification is attributable to a time-invariant trait of individuals (ρ = 1.12 2 1.12 2 +.8 2 = .66). Also growth rates by age, exposure, and experience display sizable variation across individuals suggesting that these elements of growth trajectories of partisan strength affect individuals differently.
Random growth curve models allow one not only to specify standard deviations of random effects, but to also consider correlations between them. Table 2 estimate the following covariance matrix of random effects:
Models 2 and 4 in
Negative correlations between the intercept and slopes reported in Table 2 indicate a possible ceiling effect: Those individuals with strong party identification gain little in intensity of their loyalty over time. Moreover, the effects of political exposure and electoral experience are negatively correlated suggesting that those whose party identification gains in strength by passive exposure to a political system benefit less from electoral experience and vice-versa.
In sum, the results of Model 2 suggest that the aging effect in partisan strength for the most part reflects growing electoral experience, as predicted by Converse (1969) and others. The absence of any residual age effect questions the relevance of critical life stages, as predicted by sociological research.
Also, passive exposure to a political system in the first years after initial contact with it may be helpful in providing basic contextual knowledge that is relevant for the development of party identification. Note that the results
are not an artifact of the relatively high correlation between calendar age, political exposure, and electoral experience. Excluding one of these factors at a time does not change the substantive conclusions. 
Heterogeneous Growth Trajectories
APC models based on panel data not only permit the researcher to estimate more than one cause of age differences in growth curve models at the same time, as demonstrated in the previous section, but also to estimate different growth trajectories in different groups of individuals as demonstrated, for instance, by Yang (2007) . Models 4 of Table 2 and the accompanied Figure 3 consider interaction effects between growth rate in the strength of party identification by experience, exposure, and age on the one hand and political experiences during political socialization on the other hand. These experiences are the age at first contact with a democratic regime in Germany (entry) and the level of democracy of the political regime individuals expe-rienced during political maturation (polity). Hence, the k = 1, 2, 3 growth rates in the strength of party identification by experience, exposure, and age are each a function of the mean growth rate in the sample, β 1 k,1 , the systematic deviation from this mean in groups defined by different experiences during political socialization, γ 1k polity + γ 2k entry , and the individual deviation from the linear prediction of the growth trajectory in partisan strength, ζ
The estimates of regime type experienced at age 17 of Model 4 in Table 2 suggest that growing up in a dictatorship does not significantly affect the Overall, the analysis raises doubts about the pessimistic view on late entries to a political system, particularly from individuals socialized in autocratic societies. A 17-year-old political novice is more likely to report a party identification than a 40-year-old political novice to a political system.
However, citizens entering a democratic polity late in life may catch up with natives by electoral experiences.
Conclusions
The present paper investigates growth trajectories in the strength of attach- The study provides an application of panel data and random growth curve modeling in the context of age, period, cohort analysis and illustrates in which ways panel data enable researches to address certain questions that cannot be answered in the same way using repeated cross-sections. This relates on the one hand to the identification of different processes underlying temporal changes and on the other hand to the analysis of heterogeneous temporal effects.
Substantively, the analysis suggests that electoral experience is the primary factor that generates life-cycle effects in the strength of party identification (Converse, 1969) . Particularly (residual) age seems to play a negligible role, a finding that calls the validity of sociological life-cycle interpretations of growth trajectories in the strength of party identification into question.
Also, exposure to politics only facilitates the development in the first years after initial contact with a new party system. The negative trend thereafter These individuals start with a much lower level of partisan strength than teenage political novices. But the marginal growth rate due to electoral experience is even higher in older political novices. All in all, these findings support the positive view of democratizing societies that attachments to new political parties increase in strength with every new election. This also holds for cohorts raised in formerly autocratic societies. As to migration research, the results underline the importance of integrating immigrants into the electoral process by naturalization to also strengthen their support of the democratic parties in the host country.
The focus of this article was on life-cycle differences in the strength of party identification. However, the analysis also documents considerable cohort differences, in line with previous studies. Hence, one would not expect growing partisan strength in an aging society like Germany at an aggregate level. This effect is more than counterbalanced by an ever-declining likelihood of younger cohorts to identify with political parties. Note. The estimates of the growth curve model are documented in Table 2 . For reasons of comparability of the growth curves, they are centered on the sample means. Source. SOEP v27, n=45,045, 95-percent confidence bands. Note. The estimates of the growth curve model are documented in Table 2 . For reasons of comparability of the growth curves, they are centered on the sample means. Respondents entering the German political system at age 20 or younger (solid lines) and respondents entering the political system at age 35 and older (dashed lines). Source. SOEP v27, n=45,045, 95-percent confidence bands. Note. Polity scores range between -10 (autocracy) and +10 (democracy). The figures relate to the country in which SOEP respondents resided at age 17. .00*** .00*** .00*** -.03 Exposure 4
.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.03 Exposure 5
.00*** .00*** .00*** -.03 Exposure 6
.00*** .00*** -.00** Note. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. Models (1) and (3) are OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the level of individuals and models (2) and (4) are mixed effects regressions Data Source SOEP v27.
